As tension continues to escalate between the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the Turkish government, concerns over the sectarian aspect of the issue also continue to rise. By accident or design, Turkey finds itself at the head of a regional Sunni block – including Qatar and Saudi Arabia – seeking the overthrow of the al-Assad regime. Meanwhile, al-Assad’s strongest regional backers are Shia: the regime in Iran, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. A hugely dangerous situation is developing that many fear could erupt into an enormous regional conflagration based on religious affiliations, and a look at recent tendencies within Turkish internal politics reveals that the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) government’s apparently sectarian policy on Syria is not without domestic precedent.
Despite the semantic similarity, and despite the fact that both are strands loosely within Shia Islam, the Alevis in Turkey and the Alawites in Syria are unrelated, each with their own distinct traditions and beliefs. Nevertheless, certain bonds of sympathy undoubtedly exist, if in nothing more than a shared antipathy towards the Sunni majorities in their respective countries. It is also important to remember that there is a sizable secularist constituency within the Alevis, which is deeply worried about getting involved in a regional conflagration along confessional dividing lines. The CHP, with its leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, himself an Alevi, is therefore the loudest domestic voice opposing Turkish intervention across the border in Syria.
The “progress report” on Turkey’s EU accession process, published by the European commission in October, highlighted a number of worrying recent incidents of discrimination against the Alevi community in Turkey. One of those reported in the local media involved the “marking” of doors of Alevi residents in the eastern province of Adıyaman earlier this year, which stirred sinister memories of the Kahmaranmaraş Massacre of 1978, in which 105 Alevis were killed, prior to which a similar “door marking” method was used.
Also earlier this year, an outcry followed the controversial dropping of all charges against the seven remaining suspects on trial in the Sivas Massacre case. The incident took place in the Central Anatolian town of Sivas in July 1993, when a large group of radical Sunni Islamists descended on the Madımak Hotel in the town center, which was hosting an Alevi cultural festival. The mob attacked and set fire to the hotel, resulting in the deaths of 37 people. Some 79 people had already been convicted in relation to the incident, but the seven remaining suspects were released in March owing to the statute of limitations. Many believe that the alleged murderers benefited from protection by the state even before the prosecution of the case was closed, and it has also not passed notice that a number of defense lawyers for those accused in the original case are now serving as AKP deputies. Despite the widespread consternation following the releases, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan greeted the dropping of charges limply, saying merely: “Let it be for the best.”
Another story that made news this year was the authorities’ refusal to allow for a cemevi (Alevi house of worship) to be opened alongside the mosque at the Turkish parliament. The refusal was justified on the (mistaken) grounds that Alevi deputies could simply worship at a mosque. Erdoğan has also regularly sought to score political points by none-too-subtly alluding to main opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s Alevi heritage at party rallies, and also when referring to his opposition to the government’s bellicose Syria policy.
Of course, it should be stressed that Turkish society is far less fractured along religious lines than many of its Arab neighbors to the south and east, and it also has a strong collective “national” sense transcending such fissures. However, while its important not to overemphasize the sectarian element in Turkey, it is also important not to ignore it, particularly at a time when religious-sectarian considerations are increasingly becoming political capital in the regional power play. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the Turkish government is in fact more sectarian-minded than is often appreciated, and its role as a lynchpin in a Sunni regional block should therefore perhaps not be surprising.
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has traditionally sought to stay out of inter-Arab and regional conflicts. This stance seems to have decisively changed of late. However, while Turkish foreign policy continues to have its “face turned to the east,” it must be hoped that this in practice doesn’t simply mean descending even further into a sectarian regional swamp. If formal intervention in Syria is ultimately decided upon, it is also to be hoped that this does not further exacerbate existing fault lines within Turkey itself.
*William Armstrong is a freelance journalist and editor residing in Istanbul. For further inquiries, see http://armstrongwilliam.wordpress.com
(The Journal of Turkish Weekly)
