On January 21st, 11 Islamist groups came together to form United Syrian Islamic Front. On the same day in Istanbul, an attempt to forge a transitional government for a post-Beshar Al-Assad Syria failed. The 22-month long uprising continues as various factions struggle to defeat the government’s forces. I do not think that this newest vision for the creation of a pan-Syrian resistance will work out as planned. Here’s why;
There has not been a united opposition to Al-Assad since the onset of the uprisings. Demography and geopolitics also play roles in the formation of the opposition forces. Naturally, given the abundance of religious and ethnic differences in Syria, political gains are tied to interests of the groups involved. Yet, it is hard to say that one ethnic or religious group supports a certain party. During Syria’s mandate era, the French made a good use of “divide and rule” tactic to further alienate each group from the others. This strategy was later picked up by Hafez Al-Assad during his regime’s consolidation process.
Domestically, the opposition groups are as divided as Syria itself. Even though they all have one common goal of reforming Syria one way or the other, their methods on how to achieve this differ among each group.
Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed in Istanbul whose aim at first was to overthrow the government by non-violent protests. They oppose foreign military intervention as they would like to deal with their country themselves and rely on diaspora Syrians. The council is open for all Syrians, but by ‘for all’ they mean under-represented groups. It is an umbrella organization covering other groups such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Kurds, and pro-democracy supporters. National Co-ordinating Committee is made up of leftists and some Kurds. They demand dialogues and military withdrawal from the streets. They are against military intervention like the SNC, but favor economic sanctions. Until the rise of the Islamist groups, the Free Syrian Army has been the most active in resisting Assad’s forces. They are the military defectors from Assad’s regime who have crossed into Turkey and would like to see the regime overthrown. And then, there are the youth groups. These are men and women of professional and socio-economic backgrounds who want change. Lately, Islamist groups have been on the forefront of resistance.
Externally, Syria is like a black hole that attracts neighboring countries and those whose interests are aligned with that of the regime. All the neighboring countries are affected from the crisis. Those who don’t share border with Syria such as Russia and Iran, are sucked in due to alliances dating back to the Cold War. Whether in the form of refugees, international terrorist groups, superpower rivalries or ambitions of rising regional hegemons, Syria’s crisis can have spillover effects. Therefore, foreign countries differ on which group to support against or for Assad. After all, as realpolitik goes, what is important to them is their own populations.
As written above, the ideological and technical differences present among each faction have prevented the Syrian opposition to be unitary. Beshar Al-Assad has survived this long into the uprising perhaps not so much for his militaristic regime, but due to a lack of strong resistance with a single goal. He has already proven himself to be the most obstinate ruler of the Arab Spring. Unless the opposition groups can put aside differences and all unite for one Syria (an opposition that includes foreign powers as well), we will witness more civilian deaths, and perhaps, accept a Syria under the rule of Assad for many more years to come.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
Books
Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Routledge, 2004)
Articles
The below readings are available at JSTOR:
Raymond A. Hinnebusch, State and Civil Society in Syria (The Middle East Journal) pp. 243 – 257
Daniel Pipes, The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria (The Middle Eastern Studies) pp. 429 – 450
David Roberts, The Baath and the Creation of Modern Syria (The Middle East Journal) pp. 113 – 114
John Galvani, Syria and the Baath Party, (MERIP Reports) pp. 3 – 16
Michael H. Van Dusen, Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria (The Middle East Journal) pp. 123 – 136
From Stratfor
Syria, Iran and Balance of Power in the Middle East by George Friedman
Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis by Reva Bhalla
In Syria, Opposition Struggles to Gain Foreign Support
